

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 GENEVA 07381 01 OF 02 121930Z
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00
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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 GENEVA 07381

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E.O. 11652: XGDS-3
TAGS: PARM US UK UR
SUBJECT: CTB NEGOTIATIONS: REPORT OF TECHNICAL WORKING
GROUP MEETING, MAY 12, 1978

CTB MESSAGE NO. 201

1. SUMMARY. AT MAY 12 TECHNICAL WORKING GROUP MEETING, FINCH (US) TABLED REPACKAGED ILLUSTRATIVE TEXT ON OSI RIGHTS AND FUNCTIONS. TARASOV (USSR) POSED PRELIMINARY QUESTIONS ON NATIONAL SEISMIC STATION ILLUSTRATIVE LANGUAGE TEXT TABLED MAY 8. HE ASKED FOR METHODS US IS USING TO ARRIVE AT NUMBERS AND PLACEMENT OF STATIONS, OBSERVING THAT LACK OF INFORMATION WILL NOT FACILITATE THE PACE OF WORK. HE ASKED FOR OUR PROPOSAL REGARDING STATIONS IN THE US, AND FOR COMPLETE DOCUMENTATION OF EQUIPMENT UNDER DEVELOPMENT THAT US WISHED TO PROVIDE FOR NATIONAL STATIONS. TARASOV ALSO ASKED ADDITIONAL
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 GENEVA 07381 01 OF 02 121930Z

QUESTIONS REGARDING RATIONALE BEHIND SEVERAL US-PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS. END SUMMARY.

2. AT TECHNICAL WORKING GROUP MEETING ON MAY 12, FINCH DESCRIBED CHANGES MADE TO US ILLUSTRATIVE LANGUAGE ON OSI RIGHTS AND FUNCTIONS AND TABLED TEXT (CTB NO. 200). TARASOV EXPRESSED GRATITUDE FOR MATERIAL AND DEFERRED

COMMENT.

3. TARASOV THEN ASKED A SERIES OF PRELIMINARY QUESTIONS ABOUT US DEL'S ILLUSTRATIVE TEXT ON NATIONAL SEISMIC STATIONS (NSS) TABLED ON MAY 8. HE BEGAN BY SAYING THAT IN ORDER TO ANALYZE US DEL'S PROPOSALS FULLY, SOVIET SIDE NEEDED TO KNOW THE METHODOLOGICAL PROCEDURES THE US WAS USING IN DECIDING ON NUMBERS AND PLACEMENT OF STATIONS FOR DATA EXCHANGE. HE ALSO ASKED THAT THIS BE ILLUSTRATED WITH US SUGGESTIONS FOR THE NUMBERS AND PLACEMENT OF STATIONS SUGGESTED WITHIN THE US. TARASOV ARGUED THAT EACH COUNTRY HAD THE RIGHT TO SPECIFY THE NUMBER AND LOCATION OF STATIONS IN ITS TERRITORY. FURTHERMORE, SINCE NATIONAL SEISMIC STATIONS WERE PRIMARILY A US IDEA, IT WAS UP TO THE US TO PROVIDE THE NECESSARY MATERIAL. IF NUMBERS COULD NOT BE PROVIDED NOW, TARASOV FELT PRINCIPLES USED FOR DECIDING NUMBERS AND PLACEMENT COULD STILL BE PROVIDED. HE SAID IT WAS DIFFICULT FOR SOVIET SIDE TO DISCUSS DETAILS SINCE IMPORTANT INFORMATION WAS NOT AVAILABLE, OBSERVING THAT THIS LACK OF INFORMATION WILL NOT FACILITATE THE PACE OF OUR WORK AND IS NOT THE USSR'S RESPONSIBILITY. FINCH RESPONDED THAT QUESTION OF NUMBERS WAS STILL BEING STUDIED IN THE US, AND WE WOULD HAVE PROPOSALS ON THIS BEFORE VERY LONG. PRINCIPLES USED IN DECIDING NUMBERS AND PLACEMENT COULD MOST APPROPRIATELY BE DISCUSSED AT THAT TIME; IN THE MEANTIME,

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 GENEVA 07381 01 OF 02 121930Z

USEFUL WORK COULD BE DONE ON MATERIAL INCLUDED IN US DEL DRAFT OF MAY 8. FINCH NOTED THAT WE ASSUMED SOVIETS WOULD WANT TO TAKE THE LEAD IN SUGGESTING STATION NUMBERS AND PLACEMENT IN THE US. TARASOV RESPONDED THAT SINCE THE US WAS URGING NSS'S, IT SHOULD COME UP WITH THIS MATERIAL.

4. TARASOV'S SECOND QUESTION DEALT WITH THE US SUGGESTION THAT SITE SELECTION BE MADE USING AVAILABLE NOISE DATA IF IT WERE AGREED THAT THE PREDICTED NOISE LEVEL AT BOREHOLE DEPTH WAS SATISFACTORY. WHAT SPECIFIC NOISE LEVEL WOULD THE US CONSIDER SATISFACTORY? FINCH REPLIED THAT THERE WOULD BE DIFFERENT NOISE LEVELS AT DIFFERENT SITES, BUT THAT THE OBJECTIVE IN ALL CASES WAS TO FIND A GOOD LOCATION FOR THE STATION. OUR SUGGESTED PROCEDURE WAS INTENDED TO AVOID, WHERE POSSIBLE, THE NECESSITY FOR A JOINT NOISE SURVEY.

5. THIRD, TARASOV NOTED THAT THE US PROPOSED A US-MANUFACTURED DOWNHOLE UNIT FOR NATIONAL STATIONS, AND THOUGHT IT CLEAR THAT THIS STATEMENT APPLIED TO THE SURFACE UNIT AS WELL. SINCE THE STATION CHARACTERISTICS DETERMINED

THE NATURE OF THE ENTIRE VERIFICATION SYSTEM, SOVIET DEL WOULD NEED, AT A MINIMUM, COMPLETE TECHNICAL AND DESIGN DOCUMENTATION OF THE SEISMIC STATION BEING DEVELOPED BY THE US. WHEN COULD THIS MATERIAL BE PROVIDED? FINCH NOTED THAT CONSIDERABLE DETAIL HAD BEEN PROVIDED IN PRIOR ROUNDS, BUT THAT US DEL WOULD CONSULT ON THIS AND ADVISE THE SOV DEL LATER AS TO WHEN ADDITIONAL INFORMATION MIGHT BE AVAILABLE.

6. TURNING TO THE COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM, TARASOV NOTED THE US HAS SUGGESTED THAT DATA BE PROVIDED IN REAL TIME

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PAGE 01 GENEVA 07381 02 OF 02 130004Z
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S E C R E T SECTION 02 OF 02 GENEVA 07381

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OR WITH A DELAY OF NO MORE THAN ONE HOUR. WHAT REASONING HAD THE US USED IN ARRIVING AT ONE HOUR; WHY NOT 24 HOURS OR MORE? TURNBULL (US) REPLIED THAT ONE HOUR WAS PROPOSED AS A MAXIMUM DELAY TO MINIMIZE DATA MANAGEMENT PROBLEMS AND PRESERVE THE INTEGRITY OF THE AUTHENTICATION PROCESS.

7. TARASOV THEN ASKED FOR REASONS FOR SPECIFYING BETTER THAN 99 PERCENT RELIABILITY FOR THE COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM. FINCH NOTED THAT COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS SHOULD BE HIGHLY RELIABLE AND THAT OUR EXPERIENCE INDICATED THAT 99 PERCENT SPECIFICATION CAN BE ACHIEVED.

8. TARASOV'S FINAL QUESTIONS DEALT WITH THE RELIABILITY OF THE BOREHOLE PACKAGE. WHAT SYSTEMS ARE BUILT INTO THE

BOREHOLE TO ASSURE RELIABILITY? WHEN YOU SPECIFY THREE
YEARS MEAN TIME TO FAILURE, IS THIS A GUARANTEED PERIOD,
A TESTED PERIOD, OR A DESIRED PERIOD BEFORE FAILURE?
IN RESPONSE, TURNBULL ELABORATED ON OUR THINKING ON
RELIABILITY REQUIREMENTS AND NOTED THAT BASED ON EXPERI-
SECRET

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PAGE 02 GENEVA 07381 02 OF 02 130004Z

ENCE WITH SROS, LEVEL OF QUALITY WE SOUGHT COULD BE BUILT
INTO BOREHOLE PACKAGE. JOHNSON

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